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This document responds to questions that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have received regarding 
their estimates of the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 In their original 
analysis of the impact of the legislation, CBO and JCT estimated that, on balance, 
the number of people obtaining coverage through their employer would be about 
3 million lower in 2019 under the legislation than under prior law.2 As reflected 
in CBO’s latest baseline projections, the two agencies now anticipate that, 
because of the ACA, about 3 million to 5 million fewer people, on net, will obtain 
coverage through their employer each year from 2019 through 2022 than would 
have been the case under prior law.3  
Some observers have expressed surprise that CBO and JCT have not expected a 
much larger reduction in the number of people receiving employment-based 
health insurance in light of the expanded availability of subsidized health 
insurance coverage that will result from the ACA. CBO and JCT’s estimates take 
account of that expansion, but they also recognize that the legislation leaves in 
place some financial incentives and also creates new financial incentives for firms 
to offer and for many people to obtain health insurance coverage through their 
employers. CBO and JCT have estimated that many workers and their families 
will not be eligible for Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), or substantial subsidies for the purchase of health insurance through the 
exchanges and that most employers will continue to have an economic incentive 
to offer health insurance to their employees. This analysis provides some 
                                                 
1 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111-148), as amended by the health 
care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). 
2 See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for H.R. 4872, the Reconciliation Act of 2010 
(March 20, 2010).  
3 See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of 
the Affordable Care Act (March 2012). As specified in law, and to provide a benchmark against 
which potential legislation can be measured, CBO constructs its baseline estimates under the 
assumption that current laws generally remain unchanged. 
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illustrative examples of the incentives for firms to offer health insurance under the 
ACA. 
Other analysts who have carefully modeled the nation’s existing health insurance 
system and the changes in incentives for employers to offer insurance coverage 
created by the ACA have reached conclusions similar to those of CBO and JCT or 
have predicted smaller declines (or even gains) in employment-based coverage 
owing to the law. Surveys of employers regarding their plans for offering health 
insurance coverage in the future have uncertain value and offer conflicting 
findings. One piece of evidence that may be relevant is the experience in 
Massachusetts, where employment-based health insurance coverage appears to 
have increased since that state’s reforms, which are similar but not identical to 
those in the ACA, were implemented. 
Despite the care and effort that CBO and JCT have devoted to modeling the 
health insurance system and the provisions of the ACA, there is clearly a 
tremendous amount of uncertainty about how employers and employees will 
respond to the set of opportunities and incentives under that legislation. Assessing 
the effects of broad changes in the nation’s health insurance system requires 
assumptions and projections about a wide array of technical, behavioral, and 
economic factors. In addition to the uncertainty surrounding employers’ and 
employees’ decisionmaking, there is uncertainty regarding many other factors, 
including the future growth rate of private insurance premiums and the number of 
individuals and families who will have income in the eligibility ranges for 
Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies. Moreover, models of the health 
insurance system, including those developed and used by CBO and JCT, are 
generally based on observed changes in behavior in response to modest changes 
in incentives, but the legislation enacted in 2010 is sweeping in its nature. Given 
the high degree of uncertainty, some Members of Congress have asked how CBO 
and JCT’s estimates of the effects of the ACA on health insurance coverage 
would differ under alternative assumptions about the behavior of employers. The 
analysis presented in this report is illustrative of a wide range of possible 
outcomes regarding employers’ behavior but does not reflect all of the dimensions 
of uncertainty inherent in CBO and JCT’s projections of insurance coverage.  
The analysis presented here explains two of the key assumptions about 
employers’ behavior that affect CBO and JCT’s estimates of the effects of the 
ACA and presents a range of estimates of sources of insurance coverage and 
federal budgetary outcomes that would result from the ACA under certain 
alternative assumptions. The analysis also shows how CBO and JCT’s estimates 
might differ if firms were able to, and ultimately decided to, undertake more 
widespread restructuring of their workforces than is reflected in the baseline 
projections—through strategies such as shifting more of their lower-wage workers 
into separate firms, contracting for the services of more such workers from other 
companies, or shifting their workforces toward part-time workers instead of full-
time workers.  
In the four alternative scenarios discussed below, the ACA changes the number of 
people who will obtain health insurance coverage through their employer in 2019 
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by an amount that ranges from a reduction of 20 million to a gain of 3 million 
relative to what would have occurred otherwise. Compared with the March 2012 
baseline projections for that year, the estimates under those alternative scenarios 
range from an additional decline of 14 million to a gain of 8 million people with 
employment-based coverage. In the scenario with the greatest additional reduction 
in employment-based coverage owing to the ACA (14 million), the number of 
enrollees who purchase health insurance through insurance exchanges is 9 million 
higher, the number of enrollees in Medicaid and CHIP is 2 million higher, and the 
number of uninsured is 2 million higher, than in the baseline projections. 
The differences in the estimated number of people receiving health insurance 
coverage through various sources lead to differences in the estimated budgetary 
impact of the insurance coverage provisions of the ACA. If a firm chose not to 
offer insurance coverage under the ACA, some of its workers and their families 
might enroll in Medicaid or CHIP or be eligible to receive subsidies through the 
insurance exchanges; as a result, the cost of those programs would increase. At 
the same time, the reduction in that firm’s compensation to workers that was 
provided in the form of health benefits would generally be offset by an increase in 
the compensation it provided in the form of wages and salaries. Because health 
benefits are generally not taxed but wages and salaries are, that shift in the 
composition of compensation would raise federal revenues. In addition, the 
federal government would generally receive penalty payments from the employer 
and from any employees who ended up without health insurance.  
With those cross currents, the net effect of a larger reduction in employment-
based insurance coverage on the budgetary impact of the ACA depends crucially 
on the share of the workers and their families losing such coverage who are 
eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or exchange subsidies and on the tax rates those 
workers pay. If an additional firm with a large share of low-income workers chose 
not to offer insurance coverage, the net effect would tend to be an increase in the 
federal budgetary cost of the ACA’s coverage provisions; if an additional firm 
with a small share of low-income workers chose not to offer insurance coverage, 
the net effect would tend to be a decrease in the federal budgetary cost of the 
ACA’s coverage provisions.  
In the March 2012 baseline projections, the insurance coverage provisions of the 
ACA have an estimated net cost to the federal government of $1,252 billion over 
the eleven-year period from 2012 through 2022. Under the four alternative 
scenarios examined here, that projected net cost ranges from $1,170 billion to 
$1,297 billion, representing differences relative to the baseline projections that 
range from a decrease of $82 billion (or 7 percent) to an increase of $45 billion 
(or 4 percent). The scenarios with the larger estimated costs are the ones in which 
additional reductions in employment-based coverage relative to the baseline 
projections are concentrated among low-income workers. In contrast, the scenario 
with the largest reduction in employment-based coverage actually lowers the cost 
of the ACA to the federal government relative to the baseline projections because 
the extra costs for Medicaid and exchange subsidies are more than offset by the 
increased revenues resulting from higher taxable compensation among workers 
who receive higher wages in lieu of health benefits. 
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In sum, CBO and JCT continue to expect that the Affordable Care Act will lead to 
a small reduction in employment-based health insurance. That projection arises 
from the agencies’ modeling of the many changes in opportunities and incentives 
facing employers and employees under the ACA, and it is consistent with the 
findings of other analysts who have carefully modeled the nation’s health 
insurance system. Significant changes in some of the key assumptions underlying 
the estimates lead to somewhat higher or lower projections of the change in 
employment-based health insurance and the budgetary impact of the ACA. 
However, differences in the projected change in employment-based health 
insurance tend to have limited effects on the projected budgetary impact of the 
law because changes in the availability and take-up of such insurance affect the 
federal budget through several channels that are partly offsetting. Indeed, one 
scenario examined here shows that larger reductions in employment-based health 
insurance than expected by CBO and JCT might lower rather than raise the cost of 
the insurance coverage provisions of the ACA. Accordingly, in CBO and JCT’s 
judgment, a sharp decline in employment-based health insurance as a result of the 
ACA is unlikely and, if it occurred, would not dramatically increase the cost of 
the ACA. 
CBO and JCT’s Current Estimates of the Effects of the 
ACA on Employment-Based Health Insurance Coverage 
CBO and JCT now estimate that, because of the ACA, about 3 million to 
5 million fewer people, on net, will obtain coverage through their employer each 
year from 2019 through 2022 than would have been the case under prior law.4 
(That estimate is reflected in CBO’s latest baseline projections.) That projected 
change in the number of people with employment-based insurance is the net result 
of several shifts in coverage, which can be illustrated using the estimates for 
2019. For that year, CBO and JCT estimate a net decline of 5 million in the 
number of people obtaining coverage through their employer, as a result of the 
following changes: 
■ About 11 million people who would have had an offer of employment-based 
coverage under prior law will not have an offer under the ACA. That estimate 
represents about 7 percent of the roughly 161 million people projected to have 
employment-based coverage under prior law.5 The businesses that choose not 
to offer coverage as a result of the ACA will tend to be smaller employers and 
employers with predominantly lower-wage workers; those workers and their 
families are more likely to be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or subsidies 
through the health insurance exchanges.  
 
                                                 
4 Throughout this report, estimates of the number of people who will be covered by employment-
based insurance in 2014 and later years reflect both enrollees in traditional employment-based 
insurance arrangements and enrollees covered in the Small Business Health Options Programs to 
be established under the ACA. 
5 That estimate of 161 million people with employment-based coverage under prior law excludes 
some people who would have such coverage but would also be enrolled in Medicare. 
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■ Another 3 million people who would have had employment-based insurance 
under prior law and will still have an offer of such coverage under the ACA 
will instead choose to obtain coverage from another source. Under the 
legislation, workers with an offer of employment-based coverage will 
generally be ineligible for exchange subsidies, but that “firewall” will 
presumably be enforced imperfectly, and an explicit exception to it will be 
made for workers whose offer of employment-based coverage is deemed 
unaffordable. 
 
■ About 9 million people who would not have been covered by an employment-
based plan under prior law will have that coverage under the ACA. That 
change reflects the combined impact of the insurance mandate, the penalties 
that will be imposed on employers who do not offer insurance, and the tax 
credits for certain small employers who provide insurance for their workers—
which will lead some employers who would not have offered coverage in the 
absence of the ACA to offer it and will lead some people who would not have 
taken up their employer’s offer of insurance to do so. 
 
Those estimates reflect CBO and JCT’s assessment of employers’ and employees’ 
responses to the set of opportunities and incentives under the ACA. In particular, 
they reflect the view that workers generally want to obtain health insurance 
coverage at the lowest possible cost—taking into account both the price charged 
and any tax effects or government subsidies that apply—adjusted for differences 
in the scope of coverage, out-of-pocket payments, access to health care providers, 
and other features of insurance coverage.  
On the basis of both economic theory and empirical evidence, CBO and JCT also 
think that employers generally construct compensation packages to attract the best 
available workers at the lowest possible cost.6 That is, firms attempt to offer the 
mix of wages and nonwage benefits—such as vacation time, retirement benefits, 
and health insurance—that will be most attractive to their current and potential 
employees while having the lowest cost. The attractiveness and cost of different 
mixes of compensation depend on the relative price and availability of services 
(such as health insurance) when provided by firms or purchased separately by 
workers. That relative price and availability depend partly on features of private 
markets and partly on the structure of government programs and the tax rules 
applying to firms and workers. 
The fact that many firms currently offer health insurance coverage to their 
workers despite the high cost of premiums and rapid growth in those premiums 
for many years shows that many firms continue to find health insurance coverage 
to be a worthwhile element of their compensation packages.7 If firms could have 
                                                 
6 See Janet Currie and Brigitte C. Madrian,“Health, Health Insurance, and the Labor Market,” in 
Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3 (Elsevier, 
1999), pp. 3309–3416. See also Sherwin Rosen, “The Theory of Equalizing Differences,” in Orley 
C. Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 1 (Elsevier, 1999). 
pp. 641–692.  
7 See Marc Roemer, The Number of Health Insurance Plans Sponsored by Private Sector 
Employers in 2000 and 2010. Statistical Brief No. 344 (Rockville, Md.: Agency for Healthcare 
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attracted employees more cheaply by dropping health benefits and adding wages 
or other benefits that cost less, then they would have done so. One reason that the 
provision of health insurance by firms remains cost-effective is that the price of 
health insurance with a given scope and comprehensiveness of benefits is often 
higher in the individual (nongroup) market than in the employer (group) market, 
owing to higher administrative costs for individual policies. A second reason that 
firms continue to provide health insurance is that wages received by workers are 
subject to both individual income taxes and payroll taxes, whereas health 
insurance benefits received by workers are generally not taxed. Finally, individual 
market coverage may not be viewed by employees as a good substitute for 
employment-based coverage because of the possibility of coverage exclusions or 
premium surcharges due to specific health conditions of a family member. 
The ACA will change the opportunities and incentives for employers and 
employees in fundamental ways. The key considerations include these:  
■ Beginning in 2014, individuals and families will be able to purchase health 
insurance through new exchanges at prices that will not depend on their health 
status. Currently, the nongroup health insurance market in most states does 
not offer such “community-rated, guaranteed-issue” insurance coverage.8 
 
■ Beginning in 2014, workers and their families who have family income below 
138 percent of the federal poverty level (projected to be about $33,000 for a 
family of four in 2014) will be eligible for coverage through Medicaid. In 
addition, workers who have family income above that level but below roughly 
200 percent of the federal poverty level will be eligible for significant 
subsidies through the insurance exchanges if their employer does not offer 
health insurance. In contrast, workers with family income between roughly 
200 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty level will be eligible for 
smaller subsidies through the exchanges if their employer does not offer 
coverage, and workers with higher family income will not be eligible for any 
subsidies for insurance purchased through exchanges.9  
 
■ Most large firms—which are the predominant source of employment-based 
health insurance now—have a mix of higher-income and lower-income 
workers, so not all of their employees and their dependents would be eligible 
for Medicaid, CHIP, or exchange subsidies if those employers decided not to 
offer coverage. And nondiscrimination provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code and the Public Health Service Act discourage firms from offering health 
                                                                                                                                     
Research and Quality, October 2011), www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/ 
st344/stat344.shtml. 
8 Community-rated premiums do not vary by individuals’ health characteristics; guaranteed-issue 
policies are available regardless of an individual’s health characteristics. 
9 Although workers with family income between 200 percent and 250 percent of the federal 
poverty level will be eligible for cost-sharing subsidies if they are enrolled in an exchange plan, 
those subsidies in particular are quite small compared with the cost-sharing subsidies for families 
with income below 200 percent of the federal poverty level. 
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insurance benefits to more highly paid employees while not offering them to 
lower-paid employees.10 
 
■ Employment-based health insurance will continue to receive a significant 
subsidy through the tax exclusion for employer-paid premiums and tax 
provisions that allow a large portion of employees’ shares of premiums to be 
paid out of pretax income. Those tax preferences will provide an ongoing 
incentive for employers to offer coverage, even after certain high-premium 
plans face an excise tax beginning in 2018. The value of the tax exclusion for 
workers who obtain health insurance through their employer is usually 
proportional to their combined marginal tax rates for payroll taxes and for 
federal and state income taxes. For higher-income workers, that tax subsidy 
typically amounts to more than 25 percent of the cost of premiums. The tax 
subsidy will not be available to workers whose employers drop coverage and 
who end up purchasing insurance through exchanges. 
 
■ The administrative costs involved in operating and managing health insurance 
plans will be higher in the exchanges than they will be for large employers, 
principally because administering plans (including handling enrollment and 
collecting premiums) for many individual policyholders is more expensive 
than administering them for a single employer. (However, the administrative 
costs for health insurance plans offered in the exchanges under the ACA will 
be lower than the administrative costs in the nongroup market without the 
ACA.) 
 
■ The requirement that individuals obtain health insurance coverage and the 
penalties that will apply to many individuals if they do not obtain it will lead 
more workers to seek health insurance coverage. Because employers design 
benefit packages to appeal to their current and potential workers, greater 
demand for health insurance will increase the incentive for employers to offer 
insurance as well as for employees to take up insurance offered by employers.  
 
■ The ACA applies both “sticks” and “carrots” to employers to encourage them 
to offer health insurance to their employees. Starting in 2014, firms with more 
than 50 employees that do not offer insurance and have at least one employee 
who receives an exchange subsidy will be subject to a penalty; that penalty 
will initially be as much as $2,000 per full-time worker (beyond the first 
30 such workers) and in subsequent years is set to increase at the rate of 
growth in per capita health insurance premiums. Firms with up to 25 full-
time-equivalent employees and with average annual wages of less than 
$50,000 may be eligible for a tax subsidy that covers a percentage of their 
contributions to health insurance premiums. To be eligible, employers must 
contribute at least 50 percent of the cost of premiums for single coverage for 
their employees. The maximum credit is available to employers with 10 or 
fewer full-time-equivalent employees and average annual wages of up to 
$25,000, and it phases out as average wages and the number of employees 
rise. Before 2014, the maximum credit covers up to 35 percent of an 
                                                 
10 Section 105(h) of the Internal Revenue Code and section 2716 of the Public Health Service Act. 
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employer’s payments for premiums; for 2014 and later, the credit will cover 
up to 50 percent of an employer’s payments but only for two years. (The 
average wage limits will be adjusted for inflation starting in 2014, and the 
rules for the tax credit include some additional details as well.)  
 
■ Employers who drop coverage, leaving their employees to purchase insurance 
on their own, will generally have to raise the cash compensation of their 
employees to compete with employers who continue to offer health insurance. 
Evidence of such substitution has been found in studies that examine the 
wages of workers with differing job-related insurance benefits.11 Further 
evidence of such substitution can be seen at the aggregate level: Despite 
rapidly rising costs of health benefits during the past few decades, slow 
growth of wages and salaries has caused the share of national income devoted 
to total compensation to decline slightly.  
Other Evidence About the Effects of the ACA on 
Employment-Based Health Insurance Coverage 
Other analysts who have carefully modeled the nation’s existing health insurance 
system and the changes in incentives for employers to offer insurance coverage 
created by the ACA have reached conclusions similar to those of CBO and JCT or 
have predicted smaller declines (or even gains) in employment-based coverage 
owing to the law. For example, the Office of the Actuary at the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services concluded that, on net, about 1 million fewer 
people would have employment-based coverage under the ACA in 2019 than 
under prior law.12 Analysts at the Urban Institute estimated that such coverage 
would have diminished by about half a million people, on net, if the legislation 
had been fully implemented in 2010.13 Analysts at The Lewin Group predicted a 
net reduction in employment-based coverage of about 3 million people, assuming 
full implementation in 2011.14 And analysts at RAND estimated that about 
4 million more individuals would be covered by employment-based coverage (as 
                                                 
11 See Jonathan Gruber, “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits,” American Economic 
Review, vol. 4, no. 3 (1994), pp. 622–641; Jonathan Gruber and Alan B. Krueger, “The Incidence 
of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance,” in 
David Bradford, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1991), pp. 111–144; and Craig Olson, “Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in 
Exchange for Health Benefits?” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 20, no. S2 (2002), pp. S91–
S114. 
12 See Richard S. Foster, “Estimated Financial Effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, as Amended” (Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, April 22, 2010), www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/ 
Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf. 
13 See Matthew Buettgens, Bowen Garrett, and John Holahan, America Under the Affordable Care 
Act (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, December 2010), www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412267-
america-under-aca.pdf. 
14 See The Lewin Group, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA): Long Term Costs 
for Governments, Employers, Families and Providers, Staff Working Paper No. 11 (Falls Church, 
Va: The Lewin Group, June 2010), http://www.lewin.com/publications/publication/409. 
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CBO and JCT classify such coverage) in 2016 under the ACA than under prior 
law.15,16 
Some observers have argued that employers’ decisions about whether to offer 
health insurance coverage under the ACA will not be based on the kind of 
rigorous assessment of costs and benefits—to themselves and their employees—
that are captured by the models used by CBO and JCT and by the other analysts 
just mentioned. Instead, some have argued, firms will choose not to offer 
coverage based simply on the following observations: All of their workers can 
purchase coverage through the new exchanges, which will be better in important 
respects than the current individual insurance market; some of those workers will 
receive subsidies if they buy insurance through the exchanges; the penalties 
facing firms that do not offer coverage are much smaller than the costs of 
insurance; and not offering insurance allows firms to avoid some complexity and 
uncertainty. 
As discussed above, those observations form a very incomplete picture of the 
consequences of an employer’s decision not to offer health insurance. In 
particular, many employees will not be eligible for significant exchange subsidies 
under the ACA (a point that is quantified later in this report), and the employers 
who do not offer insurance will ultimately not realize significant savings because 
they will generally need to pay higher cash compensation to attract the same 
workforce. Still, is it possible that some firms will choose not to offer health 
insurance, regardless of the full consequences for themselves or their workers? 
Certainly, not all firms will behave as the calculations underlying CBO and JCT’s 
models would predict. However, just as some employers may base a decision not 
to offer coverage on nonfinancial reasons or may not take into account all of the 
factors that CBO and JCT think are relevant, other employers may decide to keep 
offering coverage because they and their employees are accustomed to their doing 
so. And given the importance of health insurance to people and the cost of 
obtaining that insurance, it seems likely that most firms will ultimately make 
considered and informed decisions. Therefore, CBO and JCT expect that, once all 
of the key provisions in the ACA have taken effect, most firms will analyze 
carefully the opportunities and incentives that they and their workers will have. 
Surveys of employers regarding their plans for offering health insurance coverage 
in the future offer conflicting findings. For example, Mercer (a leading human 
resources consulting firm) conducted a survey in the late summer of 2011 and 
                                                 
15 See Christine Eibner and Carter C. Price, The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on Enrollment 
and Premiums, With and Without the Individual Mandate (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND 
Corporation, 2012), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1221. 
16 Other analysts have looked at the incentives for employers not to offer insurance coverage to 
individual employees on a case-by-case basis, rather than estimating how employers will respond 
to the incentives that will apply to their workforces as a whole. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin and 
Cameron Smith, Labor Markets and Health Care Reform: New Results (Washington, D.C.: 
American Action Forum, May 2010), http://americanactionforum.org/sites/default/files/OHC_ 
LabMktsHCR.pdf. Holtz-Eakin and Smith conclude that the ACA provides incentives for 
employers to drop employment-based insurance for as many as 35 million Americans. A later 
section of this report presents illustrative examples of the sort reported by Holtz-Eakin and Smith. 
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found that about 9 percent of all surveyed employers with 500 or more employees 
said they were likely to stop offering health insurance coverage to their workers 
after 2014.17 Much higher levels of employers’ dropping of health benefits were 
predicted in a survey conducted by McKinsey & Company (a leading 
international management consulting firm). In June 2011, McKinsey reported that 
about 30 percent of employers said they would “definitely or probably” stop 
offering health insurance coverage to their employees after 2014, and more than 
50 percent of employers with a high awareness of the ACA’s provisions stated 
that they would “definitely or probably” drop coverage.18 In contrast, another 
survey conducted in May 2011 by the International Foundation of Employee 
Benefit Plans found that between 1 percent and 3 percent of employers plan to 
eliminate health benefits for active employees, new workers that they will hire, 
workers’ dependents, or retirees.19 And yet another survey conducted in May 
2011 found that nearly 19 percent of employers said they would consider 
eliminating health insurance coverage in 2014.20 
Beyond the conflicting findings of these surveys, it is doubtful that any survey 
conducted today could provide very accurate predictions of employers’ future 
decisions. Responses to such surveys have no consequences for the responders, do 
not require careful analysis or extensive deliberations, and are necessarily based 
on limited information about the various ways that the ACA will affect the market 
for health insurance. In contrast, firms’ future decisions about offering health 
insurance will have significant consequences for both employers and their 
employees. Those decisions will reflect the development of the exchanges, 
changes in the price of insurance, employees’ heightened desire for health 
insurance in order to satisfy the ACA mandate, evolving market forces, and other 
factors that employers cannot fully anticipate today.  
One piece of evidence about how employers may respond to the ACA is the 
behavior of firms in Massachusetts following the implementation of that state’s 
major health care reform. That reform included many provisions that are similar 
to those of the ACA, including the creation of an insurance exchange, the 
provision of subsidies for lower-income individuals, a mandate for individuals to 
purchase insurance, and penalties for employers who do not offer health insurance 
coverage. Yet the Massachusetts reform also differed from the ACA in a number 
of ways. Some aspects of the Massachusetts law provide a stronger incentive for 
firms to offer coverage than will occur under the ACA: For example, workers in 
                                                 
17 See Mercer, “Employers Accelerate Efforts to Bring Health Care Costs Under Control,” (press 
release, New York, November 16, 2011), www.mercer.com/press-releases/1434885. 
18 See Shubhan Singhal, Jeris Stueland, and Drew Ungerman, “How U.S. Health Care Reform 
Will Affect Employee Benefits,” McKinsey Quarterly (June 2011), www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ 
mckinsey/dotcom/US%20employer%20healthcare%20survey/us_health_benefits.aspx. 
19 See International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, “New Survey Examines Employer 
Reactions to Health Care Reform One Year Later” (press release, Brookfield, Wis., June 2011), 
http://www.ifebp.org/AboutUs/PressRoom/Releases/pr_060811.htm. 
20 See Lockton, “Health Reform Challenges Employers’ Ability to Control Costs, Maintain Robust 
Plans, Survey Show,” (presentation, June 2011), www.lockton.com/Resource_/PageResource/ 
MKT/Employer%20Health%20Reform%20Survey%20Results%202011--FINAL.pdf.  
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Massachusetts who had employment-based coverage need to wait six months after 
losing coverage before becoming eligible for subsidies through the state 
exchange. In addition, firms in Massachusetts with 11 or more full-time-
equivalent employees face penalties if they do not offer coverage; under the ACA, 
by contrast, firms with fewer than 50 full-time-equivalent  employees will not 
incur such penalties. Moreover, firms that previously offered health coverage to 
their employees in both Massachusetts and other states may not want to offer 
different compensation packages in different states. However, other aspects of the 
Massachusetts law provide a weaker incentive for firms to offer coverage than 
will occur under the ACA: For example, at a given income level, individuals in 
Massachusetts who obtain coverage through the exchange receive more generous 
subsidies than under the ACA, and firms with at least 50 full-time-equivalent 
employees face smaller penalties for each worker who is not offered minimum 
health benefits.  
CBO and JCT have not modeled the Massachusetts system, so the estimated net 
impact of those differences in provisions is not clear. Still, it is noteworthy that 
employment-based health insurance coverage appears to have increased in 
Massachusetts since that state’s reforms were implemented.21 
How Characteristics of the Workforce Will Affect 
Incentives for Firms to Offer Health Insurance  
Under the ACA 
Because employers seek to offer compensation packages that are most attractive 
to current and potential employees at the lowest possible cost, their decisions 
about offering employment-based health insurance under the ACA will be 
influenced heavily by the subsidies available to some people through insurance 
exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP and by the tax treatment of employment-based 
insurance. As discussed in more detail below, if firms offer health insurance to 
some of their workers, they are generally required to offer it to all or most of their 
workers. Therefore, CBO and JCT (and many other analysts) expect that firms 
will generally make decisions about offering or not offering health insurance for 
their workers as a group. Accordingly, CBO and JCT anticipate that, when 
employers decide whether to offer coverage or not, they will weigh the value of 
the tax exclusion for employment-based insurance that is available to all of their 
employees if the firm offers coverage against the value of Medicaid and CHIP 
benefits and the exchange subsidies that will be available to some of their 
employees and their dependents if the firm does not offer coverage. As a result, 
the proportion of an employer’s workers and their families eligible for Medicaid, 
CHIP, or exchange subsidies, and the amounts of those benefits relative to the 
amounts of the tax subsidies for the employer’s workforce as a whole, will be 
central to that employer’s decision about offering health insurance. 
                                                 
21 See Sharon K. Long and Karen Stockley, “Sustaining Health Reform in a Recession: An Update 
on Massachusetts as of Fall 2009,” Health Affairs, vol. 29, no. 6 (2010), pp. 1234–1241; and 
Genevieve M. Kenney, Sharon K. Long, and Adela Luque, “Health Reform in Massachusetts Cuts 
the Uninsurance Rate for Children in Half,” Health Affairs, vol. 29, no. 6 (2010), pp. 1242–1247. 
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Proportion of the Workforce Eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or Exchange 
Subsidies Under the ACA 
A substantial proportion of workers and their families who would have 
employment-based health insurance in the absence of the ACA will not be eligible 
for Medicaid, CHIP, or significant exchange subsidies. That fact may seem 
surprising, because median household income in the United States in 2010 was 
about $49,000, and the ACA provides some exchange subsidies for families with 
income of up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level, which was about 
$88,000 in 2010 for a family of four. Three factors help to explain why most 
workers and their families who would have employment-based health insurance in 
the absence of the ACA will not be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or significant 
exchange subsidies under that law: 
 
■ First, families with workers tend to have higher income than families without 
workers, and thus higher income than families on average. 
 
■ Second, CBO and JCT expect that family income will generally rise faster 
than the federal poverty level, which is indexed to the Department of Labor’s 
consumer price index for all urban consumers.  
 
■ Third, higher-income workers are more likely than lower-income workers to 
work for a firm that offers such coverage and are more likely to take up such 
coverage when offered. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (Household 
Component) shows that, of the 5 million full-time, full-year workers who had 
family income at or below 125 percent of the federal poverty level in 2008, 
only 41 percent were covered by private (mostly employment-based) 
insurance. The survey also shows that, of the 10 million such workers who 
had family income between 125 percent and 200 percent of the federal 
poverty level, only 65 percent were covered by private insurance. In contrast, 
of the 84 million full-time, full-year workers who had family income above 
200 percent of the federal poverty level, 90 percent were covered by private 
insurance.22 
 
Owing to those factors, CBO and JCT project that, of the 159 million nonelderly 
workers and their families who the agencies project would receive employment-
based insurance coverage in 2016 in the absence of the ACA:  
 
■ Forty-nine percent (or 78 million people) are projected not to be eligible for 
Medicaid, CHIP, or any subsidies in the exchanges under the ACA because 
their income will be above 400 percent of the federal poverty level (see Figure 
1). (The percentage of all nonelderly workers and their families in that 
category is smaller―38 percent.)  
 
 
                                                 
22 For more details, see William A. Carroll and G. Edward Miller, Health Insurance Status of Full-
Time Workers by Demographic and Employer Characteristics, 2008, Statistical Brief  No. 317 
(Rockville, Md.: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, March 2011), http://www.meps. 
ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st317/stat317.pdf.  
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Figure 1.  
The Distribution of Nonelderly Workers and Their Families, by 
Family Income Relative to the Federal Poverty Level, 2016 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
■ Only 11 percent (or 17 million people) are projected to be eligible for 
Medicaid under the ACA because their income will be below 138 percent of 
the federal poverty level. (By comparison, 22 percent of all nonelderly 
workers and their families are projected to have income below 138 percent of 
the federal poverty level.)  
 
■ Only 10 percent (or 16 million people) are projected to have income between 
138 percent and 200 percent of the federal poverty level and therefore to be 
eligible for substantial subsidies in the exchanges under the ACA. 
Specifically, those people would pay between 3.4 percent and 6.5 percent of 
their income to obtain the benchmark insurance plan—the plan to which 
subsidies will be tied, which will be the second-lowest-cost “silver” plan—
and would receive cost-sharing subsidies as well.23 
 
                                                 
23 Silver plans are those with an actuarial value of 70 percent; the actuarial value of a health 
insurance plan is the share of spending on covered benefits that is paid by insurance, with the 
remainder paid out-of-pocket by enrollees. The percentage of income that will be paid in the 
exchange to obtain the benchmark plan is indexed over time under the ACA; its future value 
depends on changes in wages and health insurance premiums. See Congressional Budget Office, 
Additional Information About CBO’s Baseline Projections of Federal Subsidies for Health 
Insurance Provided Through Exchanges (May 2011). 
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■ About 30 percent (or 48 million people) are projected to have income between 
201 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty level. Those individuals 
will be eligible for subsidies in the exchanges under the ACA such that they 
would pay between 6.5 percent and 9.8 percent of their income for the 
premiums for the benchmark plan. 
Illustrative Examples of the Magnitude of the Exchange Subsidies  
Relative to the Tax Exclusion 
In addition to considering the share of its workers and their families who will be 
eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or exchange subsidies under the ACA, a firm will 
also weigh the cost to its workers of obtaining insurance through exchanges (after 
accounting for any subsidies) against the cost of obtaining insurance through the 
firm (after accounting for the tax exclusion).24 From the workers’ perspective, the 
latter cost includes the entire amount of the premiums (because the cost to firms 
of providing health insurance is ultimately reflected in lower wages and salaries 
paid to their employees), less the savings workers realize in taxes because the 
compensation they receive in the form of health benefits is generally not taxed. 
The difference in the net cost of health insurance to workers from those two 
sources will depend on differences in the price of health insurance obtained 
through the exchanges or through the firm and on the relative amount of support 
provided by exchange subsidies and the tax exclusion, which depends in turn on 
workers’ income. 
CBO and JCT project that a typical family health insurance policy purchased 
through an employer will cost about $20,000 in 2016 and that the typical 
premiums for the second-lowest-cost silver plan available through the exchanges 
for that family will be about $15,400. The difference in projected cost for the two 
policies reflects various factors: First, employment-based plans are expected to 
have an actuarial value of 85 percent (roughly comparable with the average for 
employment-based plans today), and silver plans will have an actuarial value of 
70 percent.25 Second, administrative costs are expected to be much higher for 
exchange plans than for plans offered by large employers, principally because of 
the higher cost of handling enrollment and collecting premiums. Third, the 
premiums for the second-lowest-cost silver plan are expected to be below the 
average premiums for silver plans. 
Exchange subsidies will be most beneficial for families with the lowest income. 
Consider a family of four whose income in 2016 is about 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level, which CBO and JCT estimate will imply modified adjusted 
gross income of about $50,000 (see Table 1):26 
                                                 
24 Firms will also weigh the costs and benefits for their workers of receiving subsidized health care 
through Medicaid and CHIP. That comparison plays a role in CBO and JCT’s modeling, but for 
simplicity, the following discussion focuses on the choice between employment-based coverage 
and exchange coverage.  
25 Insurance plans that have small deductibles and copayments have higher actuarial values than 
plans with large deductibles and copayments.  
26 Modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) equals adjusted gross income (AGI), untaxed Social 
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■ If the family obtained insurance coverage through an employer, then the 
combination of federal and state income and payroll taxes means that the 
average family with that income would receive a tax subsidy of 29 percent of 
the $20,000 premium, or about $5,900.27 The after-tax cost of the premium 
($20,000 - $5,900 = $14,100) plus out-of-pocket costs for medical services 
(which would be about $3,200 for such a policy) would total about $17,300. 
 
■ If, instead, the family obtained insurance coverage through an exchange and 
purchased the second-lowest-cost silver plan, it would pay no more than 
6.5 percent of its income, or about $3,200, so it would receive a subsidy of its 
premiums of about $12,200.28 The family would also be eligible for cost-
sharing subsidies of up to about $3,600 to reduce out-of-pocket costs for 
medical services. The after-subsidy cost of the premium ($15,400 - $12,200 = 
$3,200) plus the remaining out-of-pocket costs (which would be about $2,800 
for such a policy) would total about $6,000.29 
 
■ Therefore, for this family, receiving coverage through an exchange would 
save $11,300 ($17,300 - $6,000) per year relative to receiving coverage 
through an employer.  
 
For families with higher income, however, the advantage of obtaining insurance 
through an exchange is smaller because such families would receive smaller 
exchange subsidies (owing to the sliding scale under the ACA) and would lose 
larger tax subsidies for insurance obtained through their employers (owing to their 
higher income tax brackets).  
Consider, then, a family of four whose income in 2016 equals 300 percent of the 
federal poverty level, which CBO and JCT estimate will imply modified adjusted 
gross income of about $74,000. If the family obtained insurance coverage through 
an employer, it would receive, on average, a tax subsidy of 33 percent of the 
$20,000 premium, or about $6,600. If, instead, the family purchased the second-
                                                                                                                                     
Security benefits, foreign earned income that is excluded from AGI, tax-exempt interest, and 
income of dependent filers. 
27 That calculation and subsequent ones are based on current federal law, under which provisions 
of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 
(P.L. 111-312) that limited the reach of the alternative minimum tax and extended the tax cuts 
originally enacted in 2001, 2003, and 2009 have already expired or are set to expire at the end of 
2012. State taxes are calculated as the average among similar families in all states. 
28 That example and subsequent ones reflect the assumption that families choose second-lowest-
cost silver plans; if they choose more expensive plans, they will bear the extra cost of premiums 
without additional government support. CBO and JCT’s estimates of the effects of the ACA 
incorporate an additional complication that, for simplicity, is not shown in the example: When 
employers stop offering coverage, the increase in employees’ taxable compensation moves their 
income to a slightly higher percentage of the federal poverty level, which slightly reduces their 
exchange subsidy. 
29 Out-of-pocket costs are larger for the silver plan, projected to average about $6,400 per year for 
the family in this example, before taking account of the government subsidies, than for the 
employment-based plan, projected to average about $3,200 per year for the family in this example, 
because the silver plan has a lower actuarial value, as discussed above. 
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lowest-cost silver plan through an exchange, it would spend about 9.8 percent of 
its income, or about $7,200, so it would receive a subsidy of its premium of about 
$8,200. The family would typically face much higher out-of-pocket costs under 
the silver plan than under its employment-based plan. On balance, however, 
receiving coverage through an exchange would save this family about $3,000 per 
year relative to receiving coverage through an employer.  
Now consider a family of four whose income in 2016 is just under 400 percent of 
the federal poverty level, which CBO and JCT estimate will imply modified 
adjusted gross income of about $99,000. If the family obtained insurance 
coverage through an employer, it would receive, on average, a tax subsidy of 
39 percent of the premium, or about $7,800. If, instead, the family purchased the 
second-lowest-cost silver plan through an exchange, it would pay about 
9.8 percent of its income, or about $9,700, so it would receive a subsidy of its 
premium of about $5,700. Again, the family would typically face much higher 
out-of-pocket costs under the silver plan than under its employment-based plan. 
For this family, receiving coverage through an exchange would cost $700 per year 
more than receiving coverage through an employer.  
Families with income above 400 percent of the federal poverty level will not be 
eligible for any subsidies in the exchanges and will receive a significant tax 
benefit from obtaining insurance through an employment-based plan. For 
example, a family of four whose income in 2016 equals 500 percent of the federal 
poverty level, which CBO and JCT estimate will imply modified adjusted gross 
income of about $124,000, would pay about $6,300 more to receive coverage 
through an exchange than through an employer. 
For every firm, the advantages and disadvantages of offering health insurance 
coverage will depend on the effects of that decision on its workers as a group—
which will critically depend, as demonstrated by the preceding examples, on the 
composition of that firm’s workforce. For example, if 25 percent of a firm’s 
workers have income equal to 200 percent of the federal poverty level, another 
25 percent have income equal to 300 of the poverty level, and the remaining 
50 percent have income equal to 500 percent of the poverty level, calculations like 
those shown for the illustrative families indicate that the firm’s workers as a 
group would have a higher cost for coverage through exchanges than through the 
employer. In addition, firms that chose not to offer coverage would generally pay 
penalties for doing so, or if they were sufficiently small, they might forgo tax 
credits for offering coverage. Moreover, because of the penalty that most people 
would face under the ACA if they do not have insurance coverage, few 
individuals will want to go without coverage altogether. 
Some Alternative Assumptions About Employers’ 
Behavior 
In the judgment of CBO and JCT, their estimates of the effects of the insurance 
coverage provisions of the ACA on sources of coverage and the federal budget 
are in the middle of the distribution of possible outcomes. However, assessing the 
effects of broad changes in the nation’s health insurance system requires 
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assumptions and projections about a wide array of technical, behavioral, and 
economic factors. As a result, any projections of those effects are clearly quite 
uncertain. To illustrate that uncertainty, CBO and JCT have estimated the sources 
of insurance coverage and federal budgetary outcomes that would result from the 
ACA under certain alternative assumptions. 
Three aspects of CBO and JCT’s modeling that are especially important in 
estimating employers’ responses to the insurance coverage provisions of the 
ACA, and that are varied in the analysis in this report, are the following: 
■ The responsiveness of employers to the difference between the cost of health 
insurance to their employees if provided by the employers or if obtained from 
other sources (incorporating the impact of subsidies and the tax exclusion), 
 
■ The weight that employers place on their employees’ additional demand for 
health insurance coverage because of the ACA’s mandate for individuals to 
obtain insurance coverage, and 
 
■ The extent to which firms will restructure their workforces so that their low-
income workers and their families can take advantage of the exchange 
subsidies and expanded availability of Medicaid and CHIP. 
 
Regarding the first of those issues, increasing the estimated degree of 
responsiveness of employers to the difference in cost of obtaining coverage from 
different sources increases the number of people whose employers are projected 
to stop offering insurance coverage in response to the ACA. Correspondingly, 
decreasing the degree of responsiveness reduces the number of people whose 
employers are projected to stop offering coverage. CBO and JCT’s baseline 
estimates of the effects of the ACA reflect a degree of responsiveness by firms 
that is consistent with research on this topic.30 In the alternative scenarios 
presented below, CBO and JCT increase those assumed sensitivities in two 
scenarios (in two different ways) and decrease them in one scenario. 
 
Regarding the second of the issues listed above, decreasing the weight that 
employers place on employees’ additional demand for health insurance because of 
the individual mandate increases the number of people whose employers are 
projected to stop offering insurance coverage in response to the ACA. 
Correspondingly, increasing the weight that employers place on employees’ 
additional demand for health insurance decreases the number of people whose 
                                                 
30 Specifically, the price elasticity for firms of offering health insurance coverage is assumed to be 
-0.07 for very large firms (those with 1,000 employees or more), -0.15 for large firms (those with 
100 to 999 employees), -0.38 for medium-sized firms (those with 25 to 99 employees), and -1.14 
for small firms (those with fewer than 25 employees). Those figures imply, for example, that if the 
price of employer-provided health insurance increased by 1 percent, a large firm would be 
0.15 percent less likely to offer coverage. For further discussion, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Health Insurance Simulation Model: A Technical Description, Background Paper (October 2007), 
p. 18. Since the publication of that paper, CBO has changed its assumption regarding the price 
elasticity for very large firms so that it is now assumed to be -0.07 rather than zero, as indicated in 
that paper. 
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employers are projected to stop offering coverage. In their baseline estimates of 
the effects of the ACA, CBO and JCT incorporate an impact on firms’ decisions 
to offer coverage that will arise from the penalty that the ACA will impose on 
people who do not satisfy the individual mandate. The magnitude of that impact is 
consistent with the agencies’ assessment of the available evidence on this topic.31 
In the alternative scenarios presented below, CBO and JCT decrease that assumed 
impact in two scenarios and increase it in one scenario. 
The genesis of the third issue is that most firms have a mix of higher-income and 
lower-income workers, so not all workers and their dependents in any given firm 
would be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or exchange subsidies if those firms 
decided not to offer health insurance coverage. As a result, some firms might wish 
to provide health insurance only to those workers and dependents who would not 
be eligible for those programs, while allowing lower-income workers and 
dependents to obtain insurance through one of those channels. For example, some 
firms might want to design their health insurance plans so that the terms of the 
plans explicitly covered only higher-paid workers. Or some firms might want to 
reduce work hours for lower-paid workers so that they became part-time workers 
and were thus ineligible for all of the benefits provided to full-time workers. 
Alternatively, some firms might want to lay off their lower-paid workers and 
either contract for similar services through an unrelated business entity or hire 
individual workers as independent contractors.  
But there are significant legal and economic obstacles to successfully pursuing 
such restructuring of either insurance plans or workforces. First, both the Internal 
Revenue Code and the Public Health Service Act contain nondiscrimination 
provisions (expanded under the ACA) that impede firms from offering health 
insurance coverage to higher-paid employees while excluding lower-paid 
employees.32 Second, a well-developed body of law addresses the question of 
who is an employee: Both case law and employment, labor, and tax statutes make 
it difficult for a firm to claim that an individual working under its direction is not 
an employee.33 Importantly, an employer would bear the burden of proof in 
                                                 
31 See David Auerbach and others, Will Health Insurance Mandates Increase Coverage? 
Synthesizing Perspectives from the Literature in Health Economics, Tax Compliance, and 
Behavioral Economics, Congressional Budget Office Working Paper 2010-05 (August 2010).   
32 See section 105(h) of the Internal Revenue Code and section 2716 of the Public Health Service 
Act.  
33 Under both state and federal law, the tests for defining a worker’s status look to the individual 
circumstances of any particular relationship in question. Courts consider whether an individual is 
an employee or an independent contractor (and thus self-employed) in determining cases under, 
for example, title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. Whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor also has ramifications under the Internal Revenue Code (including a firm’s 
responsibility for paying employment taxes, and the tax treatment of employee benefits and plans), 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (setting minimum standards for employee 
retirement plans), the Family and Medical Leave Act (whether a firm is obligated to allow a 
worker to take unpaid leave under certain health-related circumstances), the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (whether a firm is obligated to pay the minimum wage), and the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Act (relating to advance notice in the event of plant closings and mass layoffs).  
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certain types of employment-related litigation. Although firms sometimes 
improperly classify workers, firms that do not comply with relevant worker 
classification laws are subject to serious legal and economic consequences, 
including possible loss of tax advantages, interest and penalties on unpaid taxes, 
and punitive damages.  
Under the ACA, most firms with predominantly lower-income workers will have 
less incentive than before to provide health insurance because of the expanded 
availability of subsidized insurance through Medicaid, CHIP, and insurance 
exchanges. Under pre-ACA law, though, there were already significant economic 
incentives for firms to structure their workforces so as to minimize the number of 
workers who were classified as employees; those incentives include the rules 
regarding nondiscrimination in providing pension and health insurance benefits, 
employers’ payroll tax liabilities, and minimum-wage requirements. Yet many 
firms retain a mixture of lower-paid and higher-paid employees, apparently 
finding that they can operate more efficiently by mixing workers with different 
skills and wages.  
In one of the alternative scenarios presented below, CBO and JCT assume 
substantially more restructuring by employers than is assumed in the baseline 
estimates of the effects of the ACA. In that scenario, CBO and JCT assume that 
more lower-paid employees lose their employment-based coverage while higher-
paid employees in their firms do not. Such an outcome would be consistent with a 
widespread reorganization of firms’ workforces or benefits that somehow 
circumvented or overcame the legal and economic obstacles just described.  
The Estimated Impact of the ACA Under Alternative 
Assumptions About Employers’ Behavior 
CBO and JCT’s baseline estimates of the effects of the insurance coverage 
provisions of the ACA indicate that 3 million to 5 million fewer people, on net, 
will obtain coverage through their employer each year from 2019 through 2022 
than would have been the case under prior law (see Table 2). Those estimates also 
indicate that, under the ACA, the number of people without health insurance will 
fall from between 57 million and 60 million in those years to about 26 million or 
27 million. Roughly 22 million to 23 million people are estimated to receive 
insurance coverage through the new insurance exchanges in those years, and 
16 million to 17 million additional people are estimated to be enrolled in 
Medicaid and CHIP. 
The baseline estimates include a net cost to the federal government of the 
coverage provisions of the ACA of $1,252 billion over the 11-year period from 
2012 to 2022 (see Table 3). That amount represents a gross cost to the federal 
government of $1,762 billion for Medicaid, CHIP, tax credits and other subsidies 
for the purchase of health insurance through the newly established exchanges and 
related costs, and tax credits for small employers. That gross cost is offset in part 
by $510 billion in receipts from penalty payments, the new excise tax on high-
premium insurance plans, and other budgetary effects (mostly increases in tax 
revenues).  
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Under alternative assumptions about employers’ behavior, the effects of the ACA 
on both insurance coverage and the federal budget differ from those in the 
baseline.34 Because CBO and JCT view the baseline as representing the middle of 
the distribution of possible outcomes, the four scenarios examined here include 
both larger and smaller reductions in employment-based insurance. 
Scenario 1: Greater Responsiveness by Employers to the Difference in the 
Cost of Obtaining Insurance from Different Sources and Lesser 
Responsiveness to Additional Demand for Insurance Arising from the 
Individual Mandate 
In the first scenario, CBO and JCT incorporated three changes in their 
assumptions about employers’ behavior that increase the projected number of 
employers deciding not to offer coverage: 
■ First, the assumed responsiveness of all firms to differences in the cost of 
obtaining insurance coverage was doubled relative to the responsiveness 
underlying the March 2012 baseline.35 For small firms in particular, the 
resulting degree of responsiveness is quite high relative to most estimates seen 
in the research literature. 
 
■ Second, the responsiveness to differences in cost for medium-sized and large 
firms was increased further, effectively placing additional weight on the 
eligibility for Medicaid, CHIP, and significant exchange subsidies for those 
workers and their families. Specifically, the increase in a firm’s 
responsiveness was assumed to be proportional to the share of workers at that 
firm with income below 250 percent of the federal poverty level.36 Taking 
both of those increases in responsiveness together, a large firm with all of its 
workforce composed of workers having income below 250 percent of the 
federal poverty level would have a degree of responsiveness that was four 
times its baseline value, while a large firm with all of its workforce composed 
of workers with income above 250 percent of the federal poverty level and a 
small firm with a workforce composed of workers with any amounts of 
income would have degrees of responsiveness that were twice their baseline 
values. 
 
■ Third, the effect on employers’ decisions of the increase in demand for 
insurance arising from the penalty for not satisfying the individual mandate 
was reduced by 90 percent from its baseline value. 
 
With those assumptions about employers’ behavior, CBO and JCT estimate that 
the ACA would reduce employment-based insurance coverage in 2019 by 
                                                 
34 Because the ACA does not contain major changes to employers’ incentives to offer insurance 
coverage before 2014, the alternative assumptions in the scenarios begin in 2014. 
35 As a result, in this scenario, firms’ price elasticities for offering coverage ranged from  
-0.14 for very large firms to -2.28 for small firms. 
36 Since many small firms employ primarily lower-income workers, and the first change already 
made such firms very sensitive to differences in cost, no further changes to their responsiveness 
was made in this second step. 
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12 million people, compared with 5 million in the baseline projections (see 
Table 4). Enrollment in the exchanges is estimated to be 27 million in that year, 
4 million more than in the baseline; and enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP is 
estimated to rise by 18 million, 2 million more than in the baseline. The number 
of uninsured is estimated to be 30 million less than the number under prior law, 
leaving 27 million people uninsured in 2019.  
Under those assumptions, CBO and JCT estimate that the coverage provisions of 
the ACA would have a net cost to the federal government of $1,297 billion over 
the 11-year period from 2012 to 2022, an additional cost of $45 billion relative to 
the baseline projections. With more people receiving insurance through the 
exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP than in the baseline, exchange subsidies would 
be $165 billion higher, and federal Medicaid and CHIP outlays $53 billion higher. 
However, those extra costs would be offset in large part by higher tax revenues 
stemming from an increase in taxable compensation that would occur as firms 
reduced their nontaxed payments for employment-based health insurance. That 
increase in revenues would amount to $153 billion, offsetting about 70 percent of 
the additional exchange subsidies and Medicaid and CHIP outlays. In addition, 
revenues from penalties collected from uninsured individuals and employers who 
do not provide minimum health benefits would be larger in this scenario than in 
the baseline. 
Scenario 2: Lesser Responsiveness by Employers to the Difference in the 
Cost of Obtaining Insurance from Different Sources and Greater 
Responsiveness to Additional Demand for Insurance Arising from the 
Individual Mandate 
The second scenario is meant to be the opposite of the first scenario. In this 
scenario, CBO and JCT incorporated three changes in their assumptions about 
employers’ behavior that decrease the number of employers deciding not to offer 
coverage: 
■ First, the responsiveness of all firms to differences in the cost of obtaining 
insurance coverage was cut in half relative to the responsiveness underlying 
the March 2012 baseline.  
 
■ Second, the responsiveness of medium-sized and large firms was decreased 
further, effectively placing additional weight on the preferences of higher-paid 
workers who may be more influential in setting a firm’s benefits policies. 
Specifically, the decrease in a firm’s responsiveness to lower-paid workers 
was proportional to the share of workers at a firm with income below 
250 percent of the federal poverty level. Taking both of those changes 
together, a large firm with all of its workforce composed of workers having 
income below 250 percent of the federal poverty level would have a degree of 
responsiveness that was one-quarter of its baseline value, while a large firm 
with all of its workforce composed of workers having income above 
250 percent of the federal poverty level and a small firm with a workforce 
composed of workers with any amounts of income would have degrees of 
responsiveness that were one-half their baseline values.  
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■ Third, the effect on employers’ decisions of the increase in demand for 
insurance arising from the penalty for not satisfying the individual mandate 
was increased by 90 percent from its baseline value. 
 
With those assumptions about employers’ behavior, CBO and JCT estimate that 
the ACA would increase employment-based insurance coverage in 2019 by 
3 million people, compared with a decline of 5 million in the baseline projections. 
Under that scenario, enrollment in the exchanges is estimated to be 18 million in 
that year, 4 million fewer than in the baseline, and enrollment in Medicaid and 
CHIP is estimated to rise by 15 million, 1 million fewer than in the baseline. The 
number of uninsured is estimated to be 33 million less than the number under 
prior law, leaving 24 million people uninsured in 2019. 
Under those assumptions, CBO and JCT estimate that the coverage provisions of 
the ACA would have a net cost to the federal government of $1,170 billion over 
the 11-year period from 2012 to 2022, a savings of $82 billion relative to the 
baseline projections. With fewer people receiving insurance through the 
exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP than in the baseline, exchange subsidies would 
be $179 billion lower, and federal Medicaid and CHIP outlays $43 billion lower. 
However, those savings would be offset in large part by lower tax revenues 
stemming from a decrease in taxable compensation that would occur as firms 
increased their nontaxed payments for employment-based health insurance. That 
decline in revenues would amount to $119 billion, which would offset about half 
of the additional exchange subsidies and Medicaid and CHIP outlays. In addition, 
revenues from penalties collected from uninsured individuals and employers who 
do not provide minimum health benefits would be less in this scenario than in the 
baseline. 
Scenario 3: A Variation on Scenario 1’s Greater Responsiveness by 
Employers to Differences in the Cost of Obtaining Insurance 
In the first scenario, CBO and JCT incorporated three changes in their 
assumptions about employers’ behavior that increased the number of employers 
deciding not to offer coverage. In this third scenario, CBO and JCT made 
somewhat different changes in their assumptions that also increase the number of 
employers deciding not to offer coverage but lead to different sorts of workers not 
having employment-based insurance—which leads to different estimated 
budgetary effects of the ACA. In this scenario: 
■ First, the responsiveness of all firms to differences in the cost of obtaining 
insurance coverage was increased substantially relative to the baseline values. 
Specifically, the degree of responsiveness for very large, large, and medium- 
sized firms was twice as high as the responsiveness of small employers in the 
baseline estimates, and the degree of responsiveness for small firms was four 
times its baseline level.37 The resulting elasticities represent extremely high 
degrees of responsiveness that have only rarely been reported in the research 
literature, and even then only for the behavior of small firms.38 Those 
                                                 
37 The resulting price elasticities were -2.30 and -4.60. 
38 A price elasticity in this range was reported by Roger Feldman and others, “The Effect of 
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increases in the degree of firms’ responsiveness apply regardless of the 
proportion of a firm’s workforce represented by lower-paid or higher-paid 
workers—in contrast with the increases in firms’ responsiveness in the first 
scenario, which were concentrated in firms with larger proportions of lower-
paid workers.  
 
■ Second, and matching the first scenario, the effect on employers’ decisions of 
the increase in demand for insurance arising from the penalty for not 
satisfying the individual mandate was reduced by 90 percent from its baseline 
value.  
 
With those assumptions about employers’ behavior, CBO and JCT estimate that 
the ACA would reduce employment-based insurance coverage in 2019 by 
20 million people, compared with 5 million in the baseline projections. 
Enrollment in the exchanges is estimated to be 31 million in that year, 9 million 
more than in the baseline, and enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP is estimated to 
rise by 18 million, 2 million more than in the baseline. The number of uninsured 
is estimated to be 29 million less than the number under prior law, leaving 
28 million people uninsured in 2019.  
Those estimated differences in insurance coverage relative to the baseline are 
similar in direction to those in the first scenario but generally of greater 
magnitude. However, the estimated net budgetary effect is a decrease in the cost 
of the ACA, rather than an increase, as in the first scenario.  
In this third scenario, CBO and JCT estimate that the coverage provisions of the 
ACA would have a net cost to the federal government of $1,239 billion over the 
11-year period from 2012 to 2022, a savings of $13 billion relative to the baseline 
projections. With substantially more people receiving insurance through the 
exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP than in the baseline, exchange subsidies would 
be $310 billion higher, and federal Medicaid and CHIP outlays $65 billion higher, 
than in the baseline. However, in this scenario, those extra costs would be almost 
entirely offset by higher tax revenues stemming from an increase in taxable wages 
and salaries that would occur as firms reduced their nontaxed payments for 
employment-based health insurance. That increase in revenues would amount to 
$351 billion. In addition, revenues from penalties collected from uninsured 
individuals and especially employers who do not provide minimum health 
benefits would be higher in this scenario than in the baseline. 
The budgetary effects in this scenario differ from those in the first scenario 
because the workers who lose employment-based coverage in this scenario are 
different. Increasing the responsiveness of all firms to differences in the cost of 
obtaining insurance from different sources leads to projections of a substantial 
number of workers with both lower income and higher income losing their 
employment-based coverage. The loss of employment-based coverage by lower-
                                                                                                                                     
Premiums on the Small Firm’s Decision to Offer Health Insurance.” Journal of Human Resources, 
vol. 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 635–658. 
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income workers tends to increase the deficit under the ACA because those 
workers and their dependents will generally be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or 
significant exchange subsidies. However, the loss of employment-based coverage 
by higher-income workers tends to reduce the deficit under the ACA because 
those workers and their dependents would not generally be eligible for Medicaid, 
CHIP, or significant exchange subsidies, and they would pay more in taxes as a 
result of losing the tax exclusion.  
Thus, the scenario with the largest estimated cost of the ACA is not the one with 
the largest estimated reduction in employment-based health insurance coverage 
(Scenario 3), but rather the one in which the additional reduction in such coverage 
relative to the baseline projections is concentrated among low-income workers 
(Scenario 1). Because such workers and their dependents usually face low tax 
rates and are generally eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or substantial exchange 
subsidies, their shift out of employment-based coverage tends to be costly to the 
federal government.  
Scenario 4: Substantially More Restructuring by Employers 
In the fourth scenario, CBO and JCT incorporated a substantial restructuring by 
employers in which more of their lower-paid employees lose their employment-
based coverage while their higher-paid employees do not. As discussed above, 
CBO and JCT’s baseline estimates of the effects of the ACA incorporate less 
restructuring than in this scenario because there are significant legal and 
economic obstacles to successfully pursuing such a tactic for either insurance 
plans or workforces. In this scenario, CBO and JCT assume that the effects on 
workers with income equal to 250 percent or more of the federal poverty level are 
the same as in the baseline, but that 20 percent of workers with income less than 
250 percent of the federal poverty level lose their employment-based coverage.  
With that assumption about employers’ behavior, the estimated effects on 
insurance coverage and the federal budget are similar to those under the first 
scenario. In this scenario, the ACA is estimated to reduce employment-based 
insurance coverage in 2019 by 10 million people, compared with 5 million in the 
baseline projections. Enrollment in the exchanges is estimated to be 26 million in 
that year, 3 million more than in the baseline, and enrollment in Medicaid and 
CHIP is estimated to rise by 17 million, 1 million more than in the baseline. The 
number of uninsured is estimated to be 30 million less than the number under 
prior law, leaving 27 million people uninsured in 2019.  
In this scenario, CBO and JCT estimate that the coverage provisions of the ACA 
would have a net cost to the federal government of $1,289 billion over the 11-year 
period from 2012 to 2022, which represents an additional $36 billion cost relative 
to the baseline projections. With more people receiving insurance through the 
exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP than in the baseline, exchange subsidies would 
be $146 billion higher, and federal Medicaid and CHIP outlays would be 
$27 billion higher. However, those extra costs would be offset in large part by 
higher tax revenues stemming from an increase in taxable compensation that 
would occur as firms reduced their nontaxed payments for employment-based 
health insurance. That increase in revenues would amount to $118 billion, 
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offsetting about two-thirds of the additional exchange subsidies and Medicaid and 
CHIP outlays. In addition, revenues from penalties collected from uninsured 
individuals and employers who do not provide minimum health benefits would be 
higher in this scenario than in the baseline.  
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TABLE 1.
Illustrative Comparison of Costs of Employment-Based and Exchange Coverage by Family Income, 2016
200% 300% 399% 500%
$50,000 $74,000 $99,000 $124,000
Employment-Based Coverage (Premium: $20,000; average out-of-pocket costs for medical services: $3,200)
Average marginal tax rate (Including federal and state income taxes and payroll taxes)a 29.4% 32.8% 38.8% 38.7%
Average federal and state tax subsidies for a typical employer-based plan $5,900 $6,600 $7,800 $7,700
Total cost (Including after-tax premium and out-of-pocket costs for medical services) $17,300 $16,600 $15,400 $15,500
Exchange Coverage (Premium: $15,400; average out-of-pocket costs for medical services: $6,400)
Percentage of income required to purchase second-lowest-cost silver plan 6.5% 9.8% 9.8% n.a.
Premium subsidy $12,200 $8,200 $5,700 $0
Cost-sharing subsidies $3,600 $0 $0 $0
Total cost (Including after-subsidy premium and out-of-pocket costs for medical services) $6,000 $13,600 $16,100 $21,800
Cost for Exchange Coverage Versus Employment-Based Coverage
Difference between cost of exchange coverage and cost of employment-based coverage -$11,300 -$3,000 $700 $6,300
Percentage difference between cost of exchange coverage and cost of 
     employment-based coverage -65% -18% 5% 41%
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Note: The analysis presents average expected costs in 2016 for a family of four with two adults and two children. Serving as an illustration, the analysis includes simplifying assumptions and
therefore does not incorporate all features of the ACA nor all of the differences between employment-based and exchange coverage. 
a. Marginal state income tax rates are calculated as the average across similar families in all states.
 Percentage of Federal Poverty Level
Modified Adjusted Gross Income
TABLE 2.
March 2012 Estimate of the Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage 
 EFFECTS ON INSURANCE COVERAGEa 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
 (Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)
  Prior-Law Medicaid and CHIP 34 34 35 34 32 32 31 32 32 32 32
  Coverageb Employer 154 156 157 157 159 160 160 161 161 160 161
Nongroup and Otherc 25 25 25 27 28 28 31 30 30 31 31
Uninsuredd 55 56 56 56 56 57 58 57 59 60 60
TOTAL 269 271 272 274 275 277 280 280 282 283 284
  Change Medicaid and CHIP * 1 13 15 17 16 16 16 17 17 17
Employere 1 1 -2 -2 -4 -5 -5 -5 -4 -3 -3
Nongroup and Otherc 1 * -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Exchanges 0 0 8 12 20 22 23 23 22 23 22
Uninsuredd -2 -2 -18 -24 -30 -31 -31 -31 -32 -33 -33
 Uninsured Population Under the ACA
     Number of Uninsured Nonelderly Peopled 53 53 38 32 26 26 26 26 26 27 27
     Insured Share of the Nonelderly Populationa
          Including All Residents 80% 80% 86% 88% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 90% 90%
          Excluding Unauthorized Immigrants 82% 82% 88% 91% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93%
 Memo: Exchange Enrollees and Subsidies
  Number with Unaffordable Offer from Employer f * * 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  Number of Unsubsidized Exchange Enrollees 1 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
  Average Exchange Subsidy per Subsidized Enrollee $4,780 $5,040 $5,210 $5,300 $5,780 $6,170 $6,490 $6,940 $7,270
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Notes: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is comprised of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148)  and the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152).
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program; * = between 0.5 million and -0.5 million. 
a. Figures for the nonelderly population include only residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
b. Figures reflect average annual enrollment; individuals reporting multiple sources of coverage are assigned a primary source.  To illustrate the effects of the ACA, which is now current law, changes in coverage are shown compared with
coverage projections in the absence of that legislation, or "prior law."
c. Other includes Medicare; the effects of the ACA are almost entirely on nongroup coverage. 
d. The count of uninsured people includes unauthorized immigrants as well as people who are eligible for, but not enrolled in, Medicaid. 
e. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of changes in offers of health insurance from employers and enrollment by workers and their families. For example, in 2019, an estimated  11 million people who would have
had an offer of employment-based coverage under prior law will lose their offer under current law, and another 3 million people will have an offer of employment-based  coverage but will enroll in health insurance  from another source 
instead. These flows out of employment-based coverage will be partially offset by an estimated 9 million people who will newly enroll in employment-based coverage under the ACA.
f. Workers who would have to pay more than a specified share of their income (9.5 percent in 2014) for employment-based coverage could receive subsidies via an exchange. 
TABLE 3.
March 2012 Estimate of the Budgetary Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions Contained in the Affordable Care Act 
11-Year Total, 
 EFFECTS ON THE FEDERAL DEFICITa,b 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2012-2022
 (Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
  Medicaid and CHIP Outlaysc -1 1 48 81 98 103 107 113 118 127 136 931
  Exchange Subsidies and Related Spendingd,e 2 4 16 46 74 92 102 109 114 121 127 808
  Small Employer Tax Creditsf 1 2 3 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 23
  Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 3 6 66 130 175 197 210 224 234 250 265 1,762
  Penalty Payments by Uninsured Individuals 0 0 0 -3 -6 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -9 -54
  Penalty Payments by Employersf 0 0 -4 -9 -10 -12 -13 -15 -16 -16 -17 -113
  Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plansf 0 0 0 0 0 0 -11 -18 -22 -27 -32 -111
  Other Effects on Tax Revenues and Outlaysg 0 -1 -4 -8 -16 -24 -30 -35 -38 -37 -38 -231
  NET COST OF COVERAGE PROVISIONS 3 5 58 110 143 154 150 149 151 161 169 1,252
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Notes: The Affordable Care Act is comprised of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152).
Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program
a. Does not include federal administrative costs that are subject to appropriation. 
b. Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit.   
c. Under current law, states have the flexibility to make programmatic and other budgetary changes to Medicaid and CHIP.  CBO estimates that state spending on Medicaid and CHIP in the 2012-2022 period would increase by about
$73 billion as a result of the coverage provisions.
d. Includes spending for high-risk pools, premium review activities, loans to co-op plans, grants to states for the establishment of exchanges, and the net budgetary effects of proposed collections and payments for risk adjustment and  
transitional reinsurance.
e. Figures may not equal the amounts shown in the table entitled "Health Insurance Exchanges: CBO's March 2012 Baseline" (posted on CBO's Web site) because different related items are included in the two tables. 
f. The effects on the deficit of this provision include the associated effects on tax revenues of changes in taxable compensation. 
g. The effects are almost entirely on tax revenues. CBO estimates that outlays for Social Security benefits would increase by about $7 billion over the 2012-2022 period, and that the coverage provisions would have negligible effects on 
outlays for other federal programs. 
TABLE 4.
March 2012
 Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
 CHANGE IN COVERAGE IN 2019, RELATIVE TO PRIOR LAW
 (Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)
  Medicaid and CHIP 16 18 15 18 17 2 -1 2 1
  Employera -5 -12 3 -20 -10 -7 8 -14 -5
  Nongroup and Otherb -3 -2 -4 -1 -3 * -1 1 *
  Exchanges 23 27 18 31 26 4 -4 9 3
  Uninsuredc -31 -30 -33 -29 -30 1 -2 2 1
 11-YEAR EFFECTS ON THE FEDERAL DEFICIT, 2012-2022d,e
 (Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
931 984 887 996 958 53 -43 65 27
  Exchange Subsidies and Related Spendingf 808 973 628 1,118 954 165 -179 310 146
  Small Employer Tax Creditsg 23 21 25 20 22 -2 2 -3 -1
  Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 1,762 1,978 1,541 2,134 1,934 216 -221 372 172
  Penalty Payments by Uninsured Individuals -54 -59 -49 -63 -56 -5 5 -9 -1
  Penalty Payments by Employersg -113 -130 -88 -158 -131 -17 25 -45 -18
-111 -108 -121 -93 -110 3 -10 19 1
  Other Effects on Tax Revenues and Outlaysh -231 -384 -112 -582 -349 -153 119 -351 -118
  NET COST OF COVERAGE PROVISIONS 1,252 1,297 1,170 1,239 1,289 45 -82 -13 36
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The Affordable Care Act is comprised of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) and the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152). 
The assumptions for the scenarios are as follows:
Scenario 1: Elasticities doubled for all firms, doubled again for medium-sized and large firms by proportion of workers with income below 250 percent of the poverty level; additional demand from individual mandate
reduced by 90 percent relative to baseline assumptions.
Scenario 2: Elasticities halved for all firms, halved again for medium-sized and large firms by proportion of workers with income below 250 percent of the poverty level; additional demand from individual mandate
increased by 90 percent relative to baseline assumptions.
Scenario 3: Elasticities for large and medium-sized firms increased to be twice as sensitive as that for small firms in the baseline, elasticities for small firms multiplied by four; and additional demand from individual mandate
reduced by 90 percent relative to baseline assumptions.
Scenario 4: Effects on workers with income equal to 250 percent or more of the federal poverty level are the same as in the baseline, and 20 percent of workers with income below 250 percent of the poverty level lose
employment-based coverage.
Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding.
CHIP = Children's Health Insurance Program; * = less than 0.5 million.
Changes in the Effects of the Affordable Care Act on the Number of People Obtaining Employment-Based Health Insurance with Varying 
Assumptions About Employers' Responses 
Change Compared with Baseline
  Medicaid and CHIP Outlays
  Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plansg
a. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of increases in and losses of offers of health insurance from employers and changes in enrollment by workers and their families. 
b. Other includes Medicare; the effects of the Affordable Care Act are almost entirely on nongroup coverage. 
c. The count of uninsured people includes unauthorized immigrants as well as people who are eligible for, but not enrolled in, Medicaid. 
d. Does not include federal administrative costs that are subject to appropriation. 
e. Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit.   
f. Includes spending for high-risk pools, premium review activities, loans to co-op plans, grants to states for the establishment of exchanges, and the net budgetary effects of proposed collections and payments for 
risk adjustment and transitional reinsurance.
g. The effects on the deficit of this provision include the associated effects on tax revenues of changes in taxable compensation. 
h. The effects are almost entirely on tax revenues.
